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Vladimir N. Brovkin*

The Politics of Constitutional Reform:
The New Power Structure and the
Role of the Party

Introduction
The central question facing Soviet constitutional reform is the future of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The process of reform has
only begun to redefine the place of the Party within the Soviet government, and the final outcome is far from certain. Nevertheless, it is certain that the Party apparatus is an obstacle to the economic, social, and
political transformation of the Soviet state and society.
When Mikhail S. Gorbachev came to power in 1985, he faced a difficult task. He inherited a decaying Stalinist totalitarian system in which
security agencies were above the law, and economic bureaucracies were
intertwined with corrupt Party officials. The Soviet Constitution was not
a basic law that had a binding force on ministries, departments, or the
Communist Party apparatus. The Party committees at the province
(obkom), city (gorkom), and district (raikom) levels usurped the local political and administrative power of the soviets. Party committees controlled economic targets of production, ideology, and culture, and had
power to appoint key personnel. The Constitution was no more than a
declaration of principles and rights long since forgotten and never practiced. Constitutional guarantees of individual rights, such as freedom of
speech and freedom of assembly, and of the right of the republics to
secede from the Union, for example, were merely declarative adornments to the Soviet state, and were without legal force.
In early 1988, after consolidating his power in the Communist
Party, Gorbachev began talking about a need to reform basic structures
of government and to change the Soviet Constitution. His goal, even
though he could not say it openly, was to make the Constitution a basic
fundamental law binding on his own government and the Communist
Party apparatus. Gorbachev announced his famous plan for a profound
transformation of the entire Soviet political system at the 19th Party
* Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, the Woodrow Wilson
Center; Assistant Professor, Harvard; M.A., Georgetown; Ph.D., Princeton.
23 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 323 (1990)

Cornell InternationalLaw Journal

Vol. 23

Conference in July 1988.1 He anticipated that the constitutional reformation process would occur over several years. The plan consisted of
three main stages: first, the reform of the central institutions of government; second, reform of local government; and third, the conclusion of
a new Union treaty among the republics and the creation of a new constitution. According to this schedule, central government institutions
were created in 1989. The second stage of the constitutional reform
should be concluded in 1990 in the wake of elections to local soviets and
republic legislatures. Reform of the Union structure and corresponding
amendments to the Union Constitution are scheduled to follow.
Gorbachev's task is to free the government from the stifling grasp of
the corrupt nomenklatura. Power must shift from the Communist Party
bureaucracy to the newly created and popularly elected soviets in the
central government, provinces, and republics. Reform, however, has
encountered fierce resistance from the Party. While some stages of the
constitutional reform have developed as planned, others have generated
unforeseen and potentially disruptive complications which imperil the
entire reform process.
I.

Reform of Central Government Institutions

A.

Constitutional Amendments

Before the 19th Party Conference in July 1988, conservative forces in
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) made a feeble attempt
to prevent Gorbachev from pushing through his political reform. 2 The
conservative forces were worried about Gorbachev's clearly stated intent
drastically to cut down the Party apparatus and eventually to undermine
its monopoly on political power. Many vested interests within the Party
and state bureaucracy were threatened.
The CPSU controlled the elections to the Party Conference. Consequently, Gorbachev barely had a majority of genuine supporters. Nevertheless, the conservative opposition did not challenge him openly, but
hot debates were rumored to have taken place at the closed sessions of
the Conference's committees. Gorbachev thus managed to persuade the
Conference to accept his program of political reform very 'quickly and
without genuine and open debate. On December 2, 1988, the Supreme
3
Soviet adopted corresponding amendments to the Constitution.
Two new institutions were to be established: the legislature and the
Chairmanship. A new legislature, the Congress of People's Deputies
(CPD), was elected in 1989 on the basis of the new electoral law and new
1. 0 nekotorykh neotlozhnykh merakh po prakticheskomu osushchestvleniiu reformy politicheskoi sistemy strany, Izvestiia, July 2, 1988, at 1.

2. This attempt is usually associated with the Nina Andreeva article. Since then
Andreeva has become an important leader of the conservative Communist opposition. See Andreeva, For and Against, Moscow News, Aug. 20-27, 1989, at 15.
3. Ob izmeneniiakh i dopolneniiakh Konstitutsii (Osnovnogo Zakona) SSSR, Pravda, Oct.
22, 1988, at 1.
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norms of representation. The role of this supreme legislative institution
was limited to electing the Supreme Soviet and to confirming or
rejecting the Supreme Soviet's legislation. The Supreme Soviet, a
smaller body, would actually engage in legislative activity three or four
months a year. The CPD consisted of over 2,250 deputies. Seven hundred fifty seats were reserved for various political organizations, including 100 seats for the CPSU, 100 for the trade unions, 75 for Komsomol,
and 75 for veterans. 4 Gorbachev wisely exempted the Politburo and the
Central Committee, but not its individual members, from electoral
threat. Many of these Party officials retained their seats through the 100
seats reserved for the CPSU. Many Party members resented that
Gorbachev and the Politburo had exposed them to the risk of elections
while they preserved for themselves 100 guaranteed seats on the legislature. The corporate representation provided the Party apparatus with
additional, although limited, leverage over the composition of the legislature. Regardless of the outcome of elections in the territorial districts,
several hundred delegates, hand-picked by the Party machine, would
attain seats in the CPD.
Contested elections to the legislature were designed to make the
Party compete for popular support. The cumbersome procedure of candidate nomination, selection, and confirmation as an officially registered
candidate, however, made it possible for the local Party machine to control elections to a certain extent. The local Party managed to nominate
single candidates without any competition in 384 electoral districts. 5
This generated a powerful protest movement in many cities under the
slogan: "No to elections without choice." Despite the Party's advantages under the electoral law, the Party apparatchiks suffered a crushing
defeat in the elections to the CPD. Thirty-eight obkom secretaries and
dozens of other Party officials failed to be elected. 6
When it assembled in June, 1989, the CPD reflected the composition of political forces of the time. The majority were Party officials,
most of whom had run unopposed. A dynamic minority had won
despite the obstacles put up by the Party machine.
By Western standards the CPD's proceedings looked more like a
controlled political rally than a parliamentary debate. Sensational revelations and denunciations of privileges did not change the fact that on
substantive matters the CPD had very little real power. Gorbachev
tightly controlled the agenda and ran the Congress with an iron hand.
Debates on key government appointments were rammed through in one
4. Article 18, Law on Elections of the People's Deputies, 0 vyborakh narodnykh
deputatov SSSR, Pravda, Oct. 23, 1988, at 1, col. 4.
5. V Tsentral'noi lzbiratel'noiKommissii, SOVETSKAIA RossnA (Mar. 11, 1989).
6. The election results were published in these sources: Vybor Naroda, Pravda,

Mar. 28, 1989, at 1; Za perestroiku, Pravda, Mar. 29, 1989, at 1; Mandaty na vlast,
Pravda, Mar. 30, 1989, at 1; Izvestiia, Mar. 28, 1989, at 1; Rabochaiapodderzhka,SOVETSMAIA RosSIIA, Mar. 30, 1989; Pobedy iporazheniia,SOVETSKAIA RosSIA, Mar. 31, 1989;
see also Mote, Electing the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, PROBS. COMMUNISM, Nov.-

Dec., 1989, at 51-56.
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day. He interrupted the delegates, deprived some of the floor, and
argued with others. It was his parliament, not an independent
legislature.
The Constitutional amendments of 19887 concentrated enormous
power in the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. The Presidium would
control the Supreme Soviet, and, in theory, would be accountable to the
legislative body.8 The Presidium could declare a state of emergency in
either parts of or the entire country.9 It was to be in charge of virtually
all state matters.1 0
In practical terms, the enormous power of the Presidium is in the
hands of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet (who is called the President in Western literature). His role was defined as follows: the Chairman is accountable to the CPD, 11 defines the foreign and domestic
policy agenda for the CPD, 12 proposes the head of government (the
Council of Ministers) to the Supreme Soviet, 13 heads the Defense Council, 14 and may issue ordinances [rasporiazheniia].15 These ordinances are
not defined. What would happen if the Supreme Soviet found these
ordinances objectionable? Likewise, the Constitution did not address
what would happen if the Supreme Soviet rejected the candidacy of the
Prime Minister proposed by the President. The term of office for the
Chairman was limited to no more than two five-year terms. It was not a
coincidence that there was no provision as to whether the Supreme
Soviet could nominate more than one candidate for election of the
Chairman or whether candidates had to be Communist Party officials.
The amendments left many questions unanswered.
It has been postulated that Gorbachev created a strong state apparatus as an alternative to the Party apparatus, which had been dragging
its feet in the reform process. 16 With enormous power vested in him as
the Chairman, Gorbachev has better protected himself against a replay
of the situation which made it possible to overthrow Khrushchev: a
mere vote in the Politburo and the Central Committee would not be
enough to oust him. Whereas the Chairman of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet was formerly a figurehead, Gorbachev wielded real
power. He, however, sought more than additional protection of his
power in restructuring the central bodies. Gorbachev's second goal was
to delineate the spheres of authority between the Central Committee
7. KONST. SSSR [CoNsTTMON OF THE USSR] 1988 Amendments, reprinted &
trans. in Note to the Translation of the Amendments of 1 December 1988 to the USSR Constitution in Force, 15 REv. SOCIALIST L. 75 (1989).
8. Id. at art. 119 (reprinted at 97).
9. Id.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id
Id. art. 120 (reprintedat 99).
Id. art. 121 (reprintedat 99).
Id
Id.
Id.
Hough, The Politics of Successful Economic Reform, Soy. EcoN.,Jan.-Mar., 1989, at
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and the Politburo on the one hand, and the Legislature and Council of
Ministers on the other. The legislature was to develop laws according to
his program, and the Council of Ministers' role in the government was
to implement these laws and policies.
B.

Effects of Central Reform: Analysis
Reform has not changed the Politburo's role as the Soviet Union's key
policy making institution. Gorbachev's system of 1989 attempted to create a balance of power between the Politburo and the Central Committees he led on the one hand, and the Chairmanship and the Supreme
Soviet Presidium he led on the other. It was a flexible system, which
allowed Gorbachev to rely either on top Party institutions or top state
institutions or on both, depending on the situation. The Politburo,
under his command, collectively made policy decisions on all vital
aspects of foreign and domestic policy, and the state structure, under his
control, acted upon them. If the Politburo opposed his policy,
Gorbachev could still introduce it through the legislature, thereby
bypassing the Politburo. Under this system, the Politburo and the Central Committee still remained insulated from popular elections.
Gorbachev did not diminish the power of the Politburo but redefined it
in his favor. The system allowed him to make important decisions without being accountable to the electorate, yet also allowed him to call
upon the electorate to protect him from the Politburo, should that body
challenge him. Constitutions in the Soviet Union are seemingly written
to serve rulers, not to constrain them.
1.

The Guiding Role of the CPSU in Decline

In the pre-Gorbachev Soviet constitutional system, resolutions of the
Central Committee of the CPSU essentially determined the Supreme
Soviet's legislation. In the summer of 1989, however, it became increasingly apparent that the Central Committee's resolutions were becoming
unenforceable and increasingly ignored. For example, Baltic leaders
refused to alter their legislative activity despite threats and reprimands
issued in the Central Committee declarations of August 1989.17
In the summer of 1989, the Central Committee and Politburo members realized that the rise of the CPD threatened their power. Prime
Minister and Politburo member Nikolay Pyzhkov warned, "Article 6 of
the Constitution may be changed in such a way that the role of the Party
will be reduced to nothing by the legislature." ' 18 He implied that the
new structure shifted power to the legislature. Similarly, Politburo
member Egor Ligachev made it clear that the newly created dual power
structure was unacceptable.19
17. The Central Committee declaration on the situation in the Baltics: Zaiavlenie
TsK KPSS o polozhenii v respublikakh Sovelskoi pribaltiki, Pravda, Aug. 27, 1989, at 1.

18. Nikolai Ryzhkov's speech at the Central Committee Meeting, Pravda, July 21,
1989, at 3, col. 7.
19. Egor Ligachev's speech, id.
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Party conservatives, however, were on shaky political ground. Their
attempts to defend Central Committee prerogatives over the CPD generated widespread hostility. Glasnost conditions allowed the Soviet press
to publish readers' opinions which previously would have led to imprisonment. For example, one worker wrote:
I believe that the Party, initially militant and democratic and a workerpeasant Party, has gradually swollen beyond all measure and has rotten
through hopelessly, turning into a Party of rulers, a Party of administrative-command class. It has led us to our current,20 sorry present time,
although it promised to lead us to a bright future.
All public opinion polls of the fall of 1989 showed a dramatic decline in
the authority of the CPSU and profound respect and support for the
new legislature. At a Party school conference in Moscow last fall, a highranking Soviet official said, "A tendency is growing in public opinion
towards a sharp decline in authority of the most important socio-political institutions in society: the KGB, procuracy, court, army, police, as
21
well as Komsomol, trade unions and the Party."
2. Appraisal of Central Reforms
Gorbachev emerged victorious in his first battle against the Party apparatus, stage one of his constitutional reform. The constitutional
arrangement Gorbachev created in 1989 was a transitional structure
from the unquestioned hegemony of the Politburo and the Central
Committee to the Presidential system. The legislature is in place and is
gaining authority; however, it is not yet a legislature in the Western
sense. The government is still not accountable to it. The KGB, the Ministry of Defense and scores of industrial ministries still conduct their
activity independent of CPD oversight. 2 2 Deputies complain that they
cannot find out how much is spent on defense. The CPD commission on
corruption likewise reported that the KGB and the Procurator's office
has refused legislators access to documents even though, in theory,
those agencies are accountable to the legislative body. 23 Proceedings of
the Congress of People's Deputies captivate the attention of millions of
TV viewers, but the deputies lack real rights and their status remains
undefined.
While Gorbachev initially had to contend with only conservative
Central Committee opposition, his task has become much more difficult
20. Letters from readers under the heading "The Party in Perestroika, Perestroika in the Party," Sotsialisticheskaia Industriya, Aug. 16, 1989, at 2. Reprinted in
DAILY REP. Soy. UNION, Foreign Broadcasting Information Service, FBIS-Sov., Aug.
24, 1989, at 85.

21. Speech by N. M. Blinov, Moscow Higher Party School, reprinted in, Partia i
perestroika Materialy diskussionnogo kluba Moskovskoi Vysshei Partiinoi shkoly, POLriKA,
Moscow 1989, at 75.

22. Yu. N. Afanas'ev's speech at the Second Congress of People's Deputies, (Dec.
21), Izvestiia, Dec. 23, 1989, at 7.
23. Gdlyan Commission Reports on Corruption, DAILY

Dec. 28, 1989, at 38-45.

REP.

Soy.

UNION

FBIS-Sov.,
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since the end of 1989 with the Second Congress of the CPD. A group of
reformist deputies formed a faction (unheard of in Soviet politics since
the 1920s) called the Interregional Group of Deputies. 24 Led by Yurii
Afanas'ev, Andrei Sakharov (until his death) and Boris Yeltsin, the
group quickly began to act as a progressive liberal opposition. The
Interregional Group attempted, without success, to raise the question of
the legitimacy of Article 6 of the Constitution. Article 6 guarantees the
leading role in society to the CPSU. The group claimed that no Party or
political organization should have a guaranteed leading role, and that
the next stage in the constitutional reform must be a multi-party system.
In a sensational speech, Yurii Afanas'ev said:
We are against a decreed leading role of the CPSU, that is we are against
a monopoly on power for the CPSU which has led the country to unheard
of calamities. We are against direct interference of the party apparatus,
Politburo and the Central Committee into state, economic and other
spheres of society's life. These should lie
exclusively within the compe25
tence of the soviets on the basis of law.
In December 1989, the Second Congress of People's Deputies
launched a strong movement against special election privileges for the
Communist Party. The CPD abolished both district selection meetings,
which made manipulations of elections possible, and corporate repre26
sentation. It also made appropriate changes in the electoral law.
Gorbachev found himself trying to appease both the conservatives and
the reformers, and increasingly losing the support of both.
Currently, constitutional reform has reached a precarious stalemate. On the one hand, the legislature is in place and eventually is likely
to assert its in'dependent and superior position over the CPSU, the Central Committee, and even the Politburo. On the other hand, the
Politburo still holds the de facto reigns of power, and a collision
between the two may precipitate a serious constitutional crisis.
II.

Reform of Local Government

The crucial problem in the second stage of constitutional reform is the
relationship between the city and province level Party committees and
the city and province soviets. It is difficult to reconcile the CPSU's guaranteed role with the people's sovereignty in local government elections.
24. Concerning the formation of the Interregional Group, see a special issue of
the Interregional Group's program: Narodnyi Deputat, SOVETSKH FIZIK No. 34, July
28, 1989, Moscow.
25. Yu. N. Afanas'ev's speech at the Second Congress of People's Deputies, (session of December 21), Izvestiia, Dec. 23, 1989, at 7, col. 7.
26. Supreme Soviet Votes on Draft Election Law, Report on the USSR (A weekly publication of RFE/RL) Vol. I No. 44, Nov. 3, 1989, at 34-35; ElectoralSystem Amendments
Law Adopted, Izvestiia, Dec. 23, 1989, DAILY REP. Soy. UNION FBIS-Sov., Dec. 28,
1989, at 50. For a summary of the major electoral system changes in the Constitution, see A. I. Luk'ianov's speech at the Congress of People's Deputies, Izvestiia,
Dec. 17, 1989, at 2.
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A look back at the two years of Gorbachev's reform efforts in this area
reveals that as with reform of the central institutions, he embarked upon
reform of local government with great caution. He wanted to avoid provoking the local Party, and preferred instead to give the Party time to
adjust to the reform process.
In speeches, Gorbachev persistently has reiterated that his goals
include involvement of the people [narod] in the country's affairs. He
hoped to unleash the people's creative energy and to remove the Party's
bureaucratic tutelage. Most of Gorbachev's articles and speeches stress
that power must be returned to the people's elected representatives.
The next stage [of reform] will help us to complete the task of handing
over power to the Soviets. What I mean is the stage involving the formation of republican bodies of power and local soviets. This will erhaps be
the most important event since the October revolution ....
Although he emphasized that the people must be the true masters in the
districts, cities, and provinces, he initially avoided the issue of what the
obkom secretary's authority and role would be if and when real authority
is transferred to the soviets. He did not say whether the Party committee chairman would become the soviet chairman, like the General Secretary becomes the Supreme Soviet chairman. In his speech at the 19th
Party Conference in July, 1988, Gorbachev did not explain what would
happen if a city Party boss ran and lost in an election to the local soviet
chairman. He only remarked that a Party leader would have to draw his
own conclusions. Gorbachev deliberately left this issue unresolved. Did
he mean that the Party leader must resign?
A.

Power of Obkom Secretary and the Role of the Party

Throughout 1988 and 1989, obkom secretaries remained in complete
control of the economic life in their provinces. They continued to
receive targets for grain and industrial production, and deliberately set
low targets to make sure that they were fulfilled. Indeed, there has been
little evidence of restructuring of Party self-perception, authority, or
function on the local level.
For example, Pravdareported that an obkom secretary was concerned
about conditions in his Kursk province. Roads were in terrible shape, he
described,
and eighty percent of collective farms in his Kursk were
"weak." '28 To solve these problems, he praised the contract brigades
approach and the practice of renting land to farmers. These proposals,
which projected aperestroika-typeimage, overshadow the fact that issues
such as roads and collective farms should be the responsibility of the
soviets, not Party officials. Thus, the obkom secretary appeared to define
27. Gorbachev on Electoral Changes, Moscow Television Service in Russian, October 23,
1989: DAILY REP. Soy. UNION FBIS-Sov., Oct. 24, 1989, at 40.
28. Ogromnaia sila - opyt, Pravda, Nov. 18, 1988, at 1.
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his function and role in the old way. 2 9
The literature for Party members tries to define exactly what would
remain in the Party's sphere of authority after local government reform.
The journal PartyLife contradicted Gorbachev's statements that the soviets would be in charge, stating that overall Party supervision of the economy remained in force. The journal stated that only methods would
change. The slogan of the day was changed from a command-administrative system to political leadership. The Party was to retain control in
the areas of development of economic policy, supervision of the cadres,
control of economic agencies, and supervision of democracy in the
work-place. The overall task of the Party was defined as follows: "The
Party sees the main meaning of restructuring of the Party organizations
in that they occupy themselves with truly Party work, i.e., political, organizational, and ideological work."
Party Life directed local organizations to avoid the extremes of
either abandoning the leadership roles, thereby engaging in purely
propagandistic work on the one hand, or lapsing into a command tone
on the other.3 0 The journal warned Party leaders that control over the
cadres was a powerful weapon. Party Life urged the move to a new
approach away from the old system of nomenklatura appointments. Party
leaders would recommend, not appoint, comrades for promotion. They
should persuade others rather than issue orders. 3 ' Communists, however, were urged to perceive themselves as a special, chosen people,
above others. They were to remain leaders of the society.
As its literature demonstrates, the Party interpreted Gorbachev's
call to reform local government as merely a stylistic rather than substantive change in CPSU operations. The Party was to remain a privileged,
unelected, and self-perpetuating elite.
B.

Appraisal of Local Reform

The mixed signals from Moscow were partly responsible for the local
Party's wait-and-see attitude. Both Kommunist and Party Life asserted that
the Party was in control and needed only to change its method of leadership. Gorbachev confused local Party leaders by calling for them to fulfill economic targets while also requesting that they stop issuing
commands. They felt compelled to deliver, but their power to enforce
targets was being undermined by Gorbachev's speeches.
The attempt to reform the Party in 1988 and 1989 must have been
frustrating for Gorbachev. Local Party secretaries have persistently
resisted constitutional reform since the adoption of the first constitutional amendments in 1988. For example, in the spring of 1989, they
29. For a detailed discussion of the Regional Party Secretaries' opposition to
reform, see Brovkin, First Party Secretaries: An EndangeredPoliticalSpecies?, PROBS. COMMUNISM (Jan.-Feb. 1990).
30. Partiinoerukovodstvo ekonomikoi, 21 PARTIINAIA ZHIZN' 5-7 (1988).
31. Peredovaia. Demokratizatsiiarukovodiaschei deiatel'nostii vnutrennei zhizni partii, 22
PARTIINAIA ZHIZN' 4-10 (1988).
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almost universally orchestrated CPD elections without choice by nominating themselves without alternative candidates. They disenfranchised
many voters, banned meetings of informal organizations, and relied on
old methods of administrative control. Constitutionally, all power
belonged to the soviets; in reality, however, the local Party secretaries
held a striking amount of power.
Despite the Party control and efforts to assure retention of office,
the local Party had not been able to respond to new demands and,
despite all these efforts, the election returns showed a catastrophic
defeat of Party secretaries. The returns created panic within Party organizations. The local Russian elections, originally scheduled for November, 1989, were postponed until spring of 1990. Apparently in response
to the poor performance of secretaries in the CPD elections,
Gorbachev's Party Secretariat purged those defeated from positions of
authority. This purge continued unabated throughout 1989. Over the
last months of 1989 and first weeks of 1990, not fewer than a dozen
obkom secretaries were replaced. 32 The message to the Party seems to
have been thus: either improve the local economy and win popular support, or face replacement either from above or through elections from
below.
The purge did not produce the desired results. The new officials
had the same frame of mind as the old ones. Boris Gidaspov in Leningrad replaced Yurii Solov'ev as the first obkum secretary and was just as
conservative as his predecessor, but even more aggressive and resolute
in his opposition to Gorbachev. The postponement of local elections
was a concession to the conservative Party establishment. The conservatives hoped that more time would translate into a superior and more
organized campaign.
In November, 1989, local Party leaders launched an aggressive
political campaign following the initiative of the Leningrad Obkom. It
was couched in populist denunciations of the center and blamed the
ministries and the liberal reformers forperestroika'sfailures. 33 Party conservatives tried to capture popular support by blaming Gorbachev and
perestroika for the current difficulties. The Supreme Soviet of the Russian
Federation passed a very conservative electoral law for local elections. It
retained district section meetings, which were widely perceived as Party
instruments for striking undesirable candidates off the ballot. Moreover, it preserved corporate representation for the Communist Party
and other organizations. Conservatives pushed a local election law
through the Russian Republic Supreme Soviet, which allowed formation
of production constituencies based at enterprises. Thus, Party secretar32. For a discussion of the Communist Party personnel changes, see Hough, The
Politics of Successful Economic Reform, 5 Soy. EcoN. 3-47 (1989); for the most recent
dismissals of party officials, see Plenum Magadanskogo obkoma KPSS, Izvestiia, Dec. 23,

1989, at 4; Sostoialis'plenumy, Pravda, Jan. 6, 1990, at 2.
33. See Sidorov, Tret'ia volna, 48 ARGUMENTY i FAKTY 4.
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ies could rely on loyal worker collectives to secure electoral support.3 4
Public opinion in the Soviet Union today clearly supports the institutionalization of a multi-party system. In light of the recently
announced Party platform that renounces the Communist Party's
monopoly, the multi-party system may become a reality.3 5 Interregional
opposition and the Popular Fronts in Leningrad, Moscow, and other cities, for example, are demanding a constitutional right for anyone to run
in elections against the Communist Party's candidate. It is likely that
CPSU leaders will continue to suffer substantial losses in local elections.
Liberal Popular Fronts in Russian cities are a powerful political force. In
some cities an ad hoc group of deputies to an important city soviet could
constitute a majority against the Communists. Serious conflict and even
street violence may occur if the new soviet refuses to abide by the
instructions of the CPSU province committee. The CPSU's leading role
tenuously guaranteed by the Constitution conflicts with the principle of
popularly elected soviets, and now, even the Party line. In such a situation, the inconclusiveness of the local government reform is apparent
and may lead to a constitutional crisis. There is a legislative vacuum:
political development has outpaced constitutional reform.

M. Constitutional Reform of the Union Structure
The contradiction between the provisions in the Constitution and reality
is even more glaring in this aspect of constitutional reform. The Constitution grants Soviet republics the right to secede from the Soviet
Union.3 6 This article has existed since Stalin's time, but even then everyone understood that the rights and guarantees in the Constitution did
not reflect the reality of the Soviet system. In reality, crude force and
incorporation of independent states were behind the facade of a union
of sovereign republics. The cornerstone of Communist control over the
republics was Lenin's principle that the republics would have (at least on
paper) sovereign rights, but that one united Communist Party would
serve all republics. This ingenious system preserved the attributes of
"sovereign" republics, but ensured tight control of the republics by the
Russian Communists through the Party.
In 1988, in addition to the other reforms he proposed, Gorbachev
asserted that reform of the Union structure was needed. Since this was a
very sensitive and explosive issue, constitutional reform of the Union
structure was postponed until after the creation of central institutions
and local government elections. On the eve of the 19th Party Conference in 1988, no one expected that the status of Union Republics would
be the number one issue on the national agenda. No one expected that
34. Rossia. Diskussia v Parlamente, Pravda, Oct. 27, 1989, at 3.
35. Lithuania and Estonia dropped the Communist Party leading role clause from
their Constitutions. See Lithuanian 7 December Supreme Soviet Session and More on End of
Lithuanian Party Monopoly, DAILY REP. Soy. UNION FBIS-Sov., Dec. 8, 1989, at 48-51.
36. KONST. SSSR, supra note 7, art. 72.
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within a year and a half powerful political parties would rise in the
republics and that they would be stronger and more popular than the
Communist Party itself, or that Lithuania would declare its
independence.
A.

Popular Fronts and Reform of the Republic-Union Relationship

In the fall of 1988, Popular Fronts emerged as political organizations in
the Baltic republics. 3 7 Wisely, Gorbachev welcomed their appearance,
viewing them as instruments of support against the entrenched resistance of the CPSU bureaucracy. Popular Fronts were Gorbachev's supporters for democratization, and economic and legal reform. They were
liberals who shared the same goal of creating a state based on the rule of
law. In the spring of 1989, similar Popular Fronts appeared in Leningrad, Moscow, Yaroslavl', and Novosibirsk, and in many other Russian
and Ukrainian cities. Liberal intelligentsia entered the political arena on
the side of reform and Gorbachev.
In the Union republics, however, economic reform and democratization immediately brought Popular Fronts into conflict with Moscow's
political and economic bureaucracy (the Central Committee and the
ministries). The reform process acquired overtones of national liberation. Popular Fronts in the Baltics and other republics began to act as if
the words "union of republics" were not a facade, but a constitutional
reality. Under the influence of Popular Fronts, local Communists began
to act in harmony with them. Their legislatures passed a number of laws
on citizenship, language, elections, and property rights that challenged
the dictatorship of the Ministries and Central Committee. Several times
during 1989 Gorbachev declared legislation in the Baltics unconstitutional and illegal. 38 In its August 1989 declaration, the Central Committee warned the Baltics that the course of separatism was fraught with
bloodshed and tragedy.
There was nothing unconstitutional in the Baltic legislature's
action. The Central Committee acted as if the constitutional guarantee
of the right to secede did not exist. In fact, at that stage, there was no
movement for outright secession. The Communist Party in these republics and the Popular Fronts still talked in terms of equal rights for sovereign Soviet republics. Threats from the Central Committee and local
elections in the Baltics in 1990, however, profoundly changed the
situation.
Facing local elections and the prospect of heavy losses, the Lithuanian Communist Party decided to break away from the Moscow Commu37. For a discussion of the development of Popular Fronts in the Baltic republics,
see Dreifelds, Latvian NationalRebirth, PROBS. COMMUNISM (July-Aug. 1989), at 77-94;
Taagepera, Estonia'sRoad to Independence, PROBS. COMMUNISM (Nov.-Dec. 1989) at 1126.
38. See, e.g., Ukaz Prezidiuma Verkhovnoga Soveta SSSR, Pravda, Aug. 17, 1989,

at 2

(USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Decree on elections to local soviets.., in Estonian
SSR).
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nists in December 1989. 39 It was an unprecedented step which
amounted to a profound constitutional crisis. The Lithuanian Communists' message to Moscow was clear: to compete with the Lithuanian
Popular Front (Sajudis) in elections for popular support, the Lithuanian
Communists could not be seen merely as subordinates of the Soviet
Central Committee. Moscow clearly would benefit from continued dealings with Lithuanian Communists rather than with the Sajudis, yet Moscow could not use force without harming relations with the West.
In December, 1989, the All-Union Central Committee plenum
debated the separation of the Lithuanian Communist Party. Ignoring
the constitutional right of secession, Gorbachev said:
The separatists are pushing the people into a historical dead-end. I do
not cease repeating it, because I am deeply convinced of it.
The current Party and state leadership will not permit the dissolution
of the Union State. I would like to say
this at the Central Committee
40
plenum openly and straightforwardly.
At this stage Gorbachev took a hard line toward his Lithuanian comrades. He portrayed decisions of the Lithuanian Party Congress as
capitulations to bourgeois nationalists and separatists, and condemned
their choice:
The decisions of the 20th Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party
seen from an organizational and statutory angle, are unlawful
[nepravomochny]. The delegates to this Congress were elected in accordance with the statutes of the CPSU, on the platform of the CPSU, in
accord with the norms of Party life in the CPSU. They 4had
received a
1
mandate for restructuring and not for splitting the Party.
Clearly motivated by dramatic and unexpected events in the Baltic
republics, Gorbachev sided with those who strove to establish a legal
mechanism that would make it difficult, if not impossible, for these
republics to secede from the Soviet Union.
B.

Constititutional Oversight Committee and Federative Relations

Debates at the Second Congress of People's Deputies in December,
1989, demonstrated that the role of Union straightjacket was assigned to
the Constitutional Oversight Committee. The deputies were convinced
of the need for an institution that would verify the constitutionality of
hundreds of instructions and circulars issued by ministries and local
bodies. Liberal critics pointed out that the bill did not encompass oversight of the activities of Politburo members. Deputy T. E. Abuladze (a
well-known Georgian film producer) asked:
39. Olkrylsia S'ezd Komparifi Litvy, Pravda, Dec. 20, 1989, at 3.

40. M. S. Gorbachev's speech at the C. C. Plenum, V edinstve partii-sud'baperestroiki, Izvestiia, Dec. 26, 1989, at 2, col. 2, 6.
41. Id.
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Is the future Constitutional Oversight Committee going to guard us from
the arbitrary decisions of political institutions, such as, for example, possible directives in the future of the Central Committee Secretary on agriculture, on deployment
of the army for punitive operations against its
42
own people?
Abuladze was referring to Ligachev's involvement in dispatching troops
to Tbilisi in the spring of 1989, which ended in a massacre of demonstrators. Other liberal and Baltic deputies argued that the Constitutional Oversight Committee would curtail laws passed in the republics
rather than the powers of the Politburo, Ministry of Defense and the
KGB. Baltic laws on language, residence requirements, elections, military personnel rights as well as other laws and ordinances were now constitutionally vulnerable. People's Deputy V. Ya. Skudra, the Latvian
Minister of Justice, said:
Today as never before, it is necessary to take into account the simple
truth that federative relations in our society must be based not on methods of administrative fiat, not on permissions and prohibitions, but
43 exclusively on the willingness of the republics to maintain the Union.
The group of Baltic deputies sharply criticized the projected amendment. 44 Other liberal delegates insisted that all disputes between
republics should be resolved on the basis of the new Union treaty, which
would define the prerogatives of the Union and the republics. In a powerful speech on behalf of the Interregional Group, Yurii Afanasiev said,
"We are against subordination of the national republics to the strong
center, that is we are against a unitary imperial state, which had been
created by Stalin and is being preserved to this very day." '4 5 In other
words, there should be no Central Oversight Committee prior to a
treaty which would protect republican autonomy. Until such a treaty
was concluded, no Oversight Committee should be created. Deputy T.
E. Abuladze put it this way: "I will vote against adoption of the law, the
purpose of which is to guard Stalinist-Brezhnevist principles of false
'4 6
freedom and fictitious equal rights."
The leader of the Interregional Group and a member of the Constitutional Revisions Committee, Andrei Sakharov, had been working on
the new Constitution until his sudden death. He envisioned the creation
42. T. E. Abuladze's speech at the Second Congress of People's Deputies (Dec.
22 session). Vtoroi S'ezd Narodnykh Deputatov, Stenograficheskii otchet, Izvestiia, Dec. 23,

1989, at 10, col. 7.
43. V. Ya. Skudra's speech at the Second Congress of People's Deputies (Dec. 22
session). Id., col. 3-4.
44. For a summary of the Baltic Parliamentary Group declaration, see Pravovye
garantiiperestroiki, Izvestiia, Dec. 23, 1989, at 4.

45. Yu. N. Afanas'ev's speech at the Second Congress of People's Deputies (Dec.
21 session). Id. at 7.
46. T. E. Abuladze's speech. Id. at 10. For a detailed discussion of the development of the Central Oversight Committee (or Committee of Constitutional Supervision), see Hausmaninger, The Committee of Constitutional Supervision of the USSR, 23
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of a voluntary union of republics based on such a treaty. 47 The conservative majority in the CPD, however, prevailed and the Constitutional
Oversight Committee was created. 48 It is likely that the Baltic legislatures will ignore its rulings and precipitate a series of new constitutional
crises.
C. Appraisal
The constitutional reform of the Union structures has so far been nothing more than an attempt to negate and whitewash the theoretical right
of the Union republics to secede. The constitutional amendments of
December, 1989, the Party declaration of August, 1989, and the creation
of the Constitutional Oversight Committee should be seen as the Party
leadership's attempts to adjust to the quickly changing political reality.
Throughout this period, Moscow reacted with astonishment and reprisal, followed by grudging acceptance of de facto changes.
Neither side is satisfied with the Constitution as it stands. The
republics want to preserve the secession clause and instill some concrete
meaning into it. The CPSU leadership ignores the clause and issues
warnings and threats. Gorbachev has done nothing but maneuver and
compromise. He responds to initiatives instead of taking them. He
tried to please the conservative Central Committee by warning and
threatening the Lithuanians, but in the end, he acquiesced to the ever
increasing demands of the Baltic republics. In early January, 1990, he
even suggested that a law should be drafted that would provide a procedure for a union republic to secede.
The prospect of a constitutional order based on a treaty of equal
republics still exists. If Gorbachev is to attain his goal of creating a constitutional regime based on a rule of law, he must live up to the promise
he made to the United Nations to respect sovereignty and free choice. It
is likely that by the time a new treaty is drafted some other Soviet republics in addition to Lithuania will declare independence, with or without
constitutional reform.
Conclusion
The constitutional reform process in the Soviet Union has reached a
dangerous point. Political development far outstrips constitutional
reform. Central institutions of state power are in disarray. The prestige
and authority of the Politburo, Central Committee, KGB, and the Party
as a whole, are in precipitous decline. The relations and rules of the
Politburo and legislature are not defined. A de facto dual power system
47. For a discussion of Sakharov's constitution draft, see Remnick, Soviet Rights
Champion Left Model Constitution, Wash. Post, Dec. 18, 1989, at A27.
48. For the text of the law amending the constitution and creating the Constitutional Oversight Committee, see Zakon SSSR o Konstitutsionnom nadzore v SSSR and
Zakon SSSR ob izmeneniiakh i dopolneniiakhstat i 125 Konstitutsii SSSR, Izvestiia, Dec. 26,
1989, at 1, 3. See also Hausmaninger, The Committee of ConstitutionalSupervision of the
USSR, 23 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 287 (1990).
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exists between the Central Committee and Politburo on the one hand,
and the Congress of People's Deputies on the other. In local government, a revolutionary upheaval is unfolding which has already begun to
sweep away the Party's constitutionally guaranteed monopoly on power.
Reform of the Union structure has been disruptive and explosive.
In the republics, a bitter and escalating struggle over old grievances,
territorial rivalries, language use priority, water, resources, and political
rights is likely to transform the Soviet Union beyond recognition.
Constitutions are created to establish basic laws for a country that
already exists. The Soviet Union apparently contains many people who
do not want to be part of it. What started as constitutional reform
directed at peaceful transformation from a dictatorial bureaucratic
empire into a constitutional democracy has turned into a revolutionary
upheaval. Reform of the basic political structures has turned some
reformers into revolutionaries. The Interregional Group is no longer
satisfied with a reformed constitution. It wants a new democratic constitution. Baltics, Transcaucasians, Moldavians, and Ukrainians all want to
redefine their place in the Soviet Union or secede. They reject the current constitution as outdated. Yet, constitutional reform has triggered
fierce opposition from the Communist Party to all three areas of reform
discussed above.
A situation is developing in which no one is satisfied with the
emerging constitutional reform. The Party wants its dominant position
restored. The awakened society in Russia and the national movements
in the republics want to move on. As initiator of the constitutional
reform, Gorbachev is increasingly running the risk of not being able to
satisfy either the Party or the reformers. The current Soviet Constitution is like a building under repair. Some parts have been disassembled,
but new parts have not yet been put into place. In this case, the entire
building may collapse.
Legislative power must shift to the CPD, and executive power must
shift to the Council of Ministers, which is accountable to the legislature.
The army and the KGB must cease to be instruments of the Party and
become state institutions outside Party control. This amounts to separating the Communist Party from the state, and making it equal to other
political parties. To make this constitutional reform logical, the Soviet
Union must remove Article 6 from the Constitution, thus making the
Politburo of the CPSU a Party body rather than a state governing body.
All of this implies that for the first time since the Bolshevik Revolution, some party other than the Communist Party may form local and
even central governments. Such changes in law would be a radical
departure from all post-Lenin Soviet Constitutions and may serve as the
cornerstone to a new democratic constitution.
Constitutional reform requires respect for the right of every republic to secede, and to work out a new Union treaty for those who prefer to
stay. If Gorbachev survives the attack of the Party bureaucracy, he might
lead the country to real constitutional reform. It is also possible, how-
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ever, that the forces he has unleashed will spin out of control and turn
49
constitutional reform into a revolution, and possibly a civil war.

49. This Article was submitted for publication on February 16, 1990. During
March and April of 1990, the process of constitutional reform in the Soviet Union
entered a new stage. Gorbachev abandoned the post of Chairman of the Supreme
Soviet and accepted the newly-created post of President. The Central Committee
plenum recommended that Article 6 of the Constitution be scrapped, which opens
the way for the emergence of a multi-party system. Local elections in March of 1990
have demonstrated that the Popular Fronts, as expected, have scored major victories
over Communist candidates in a number of large cities. Finally, the constitutional
crisis over Lithuania's declaration of independence entered an explosive and dangerous stage.
These revolutionary developments demonstrate that in the three areas of constitutional reform considered in this Article (reform of central government, reform of
local government, and reform of the union structure), the Communist Party, as a
pivotal institution of the Soviet political system, is in the process of disintegration.
The year 1990 may well mark a new stage in the transition to a dramatically different
political system based on executive presidency in the central government, a multiparty system in local government, and secessionist struggle of some republics in the
Union structure.

